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INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 1948, a debate was in progress in the House of Repre-
sentatives concerning a report of the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee questioning the loyalty of a prominent government scientist. Dur-
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ing the debate, which centered on the refusal of President Truman to
release the full text of an F.B.I. memorandum about the accused scientist,
Congressman Richard Nixon, a member of the Committee, rose in the
chamber and said:
I am now going to address myself to a second issue which is very impor-
tant. The point has been made that the President of the United States
has issued an order that none of this information can be released to the
Congress -and that therefore the Congress has no right to question the
judgment of the President in making that decision.
I say that that proposition cannot stand from a constitutional standpoint
or on the basis of the merits for this very good reason: That would mean
that the President could have arbitrarily issued an Executive order in
the Myers case, the Teapot Dome case, or any other case denying the
Congress of the United States information it needed to conduct an in-
vestigation of the executive department and the Congress would have no
right to question his decision.
Any such order of the President can be questioned by the Congress as
to whether or not that order is justified on the merits.1
I. EXECUTiVE PRIVILEGE AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY
A. Widespread Use of Executive Privilege
The Executive's claimed privilege to withhold information from Con-
gress is often clouded by political controversy. Perhaps this is so because
the issue has developed as a byproduct of the often turbulent relationship
between the two "political" branches of the government, and so far has
eluded resolution by the Supreme Court.
Executive privilege has proliferated over the decades very much as
executive power itself has grown. Early presidents asserted the privilege
infrequently and in narrow circumstances. Often the doctrine was for-
mulated in a manner which implied that the Executive could withhold
information only with the consent of Congress. Modern presidential
government, on the other hand, is symbolized by the frequency with
which information is withheld from Congress at the sole discretion of
the Executive. The Library of Congress reported in March 1973 that
executive privilege had been asserted 49 times since 1952-more than
twice the number of all prior claims.2 The Nixon Administration, while
professing that it had done more than its predecessors to regularize the
flow of information to Congress, had in fact broken all records by formal-
194 CONG. REc 4783 (1948).
2THE PRESENT LIMITS OF "EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE" (a study prepared by the Govern-
menit and General Research Division of the Library of Congress), CONG, RIEC, H2243-46
(daily ed. March 28, 1973). Since March of 1973 the Nixon Administration has asserted
executive privilege two additional times.
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ly denying information or witnesses to Congress at least twenty times
in four years. 3
An indication that executive privilege is a vital pressure point in the
struggle between Congress and the President is the regularity with which
the doctrine is used to cut off congressional inquiry into the very issues
over which Congress and the President are most sharply divided. Not
surprisingly, many observers have concluded that the Executive often
balks at requests for information merely to prevent certain controversial
subjects from being further explored by a hostile Congress.4 By with-
holding crucial information or witnesses modern presidents have discov-
ered that they can exercise an effective veto over attempts by Congress
to act in certain areas, particularly foreign affairs.'
B. Government Secrecy
Secrecy in government has taken different forms from one admin-
istration to the next, but its consistent premise has been an assumed right
of the President acting in the public interest to withhold certain informa-
tion which he has acquired in the course of executing the laws. This
premise is most clearly reflected in formal claims of executive privilege,
but it also may be found in a wide variety of other practices of secrecy
behind which the executive branch attempts to conduct its operations
without interference from the coordinate branches of government or from
the public.
The institutional patterns of executive secrecy are perhaps best re-
vealed in matters of foreign affairs. Whenever the Departments of State
3 Id. On five of these occasions the President himself claimed executive privilege; cabinet
members and agency heads have done so 15 times on his behalf.
4 Indeed, General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Kennedy
Administration, candidly admitted as much when he declined an invitation to testify about
the Bay of Pigs invasion by stating that his appearance would only "result in another highly
controversial, divisive public discussion among branches of our Government which would
be damaging to all parties concerned." 109 CONG. REc. 5817 (1963) (quoted in remarks
of Congressman Ford).
5 It should have come as no surprise, for example, that General Taylor declined to appear
before the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations in April 1963 to discuss the
Bay of Pigs invasion; that Treasury Secre:ary Connally declined to testify before the Joint
Economic Committee in April 1972 on the refusal of his subordinates to supply records
to the General Accounting Office on the governments loan to the Loctheed Aircraft Cor-
pora:ion; or that the Department of Defense refused in December 1972 to supply documents
requested by the House Armed Services Committee during its hearings on the firing of
General John D. Lavelle, who reportedly conducted unauthorized raids over North Vietnam.
CONG. REC. H2245 (daily ed. March 28, 1973).
After President Nixon had effectively vetoed an inquiry by the Senate- Foreign Relations
Committee into grants of foreign military aid by claiming executive privilege over certain
Defense Department documents, Senator Fulbright tersely pointed out that the President's
action makes it most difficult "to legislate in the area of foreign military assistance." N.Y.
Times, Sept. 1, 1971 at 1, Col. 4.
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or Defense are compelled to articulate in court why foreign affairs must
not be conducted openly, they resort to the sweeping language of the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,0 language
which has often been cited as the basis for executive secrecy in other
areas as well:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation
... He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harm.
ful results.8
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success
must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a
full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions
which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely im-
politic.0
When the Executive acts in areas touching upon foreign affairs, it is
protected by a variety of shields, some of which are sanctioned by Con-
gress, some by the courts, and some by both. It need not, for example,
engage in public rule-making, since the procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act do not apply "to the extent that there is
involved . . . a military or foreign affairs function of the United States.
" . .10 This statutory exemption means that an agency is not required
to give notice through the Federal Register or otherwise of rules or other
decisions it is considering promulgating; to describe a proposed rule or
decision and its underlying authority; to give interested persons an op-
portunity to participate through submission of written views; nor to
render decisions supported by a record stating the basis and purpose of
the decision. Since these administrative formalities are dispensed with
when the Executive acts in foreign affairs, secrecy in this area is not dif-
ficult to enforce.
A second shield behind which the Executive can act in secret-even
6 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
It is worth noting that the Curtiss- Wright decision has recently been reexamined from
an historical perspective, and has been rejected as a relatively weak basis for judicial recogni-
tion of claims of inherent executive power in the conduct of foreign affairs. See Lofgren,
United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALII
L.J. 1 (1973).
7 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
8 Id. at 320.
9 Id at 320-21 quoting 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 194 (Pres. Washington).
10 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
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outside the area of foreign affairs-is, ironically, the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act." Although the purpose of the Act is to establish the gen-
eral rule that government agencies should make information available
to the public upon demand, the rule does not apply to nine enumerated
categories of information, chief of which are foreign affairs, internal agen-
cy memoranda, investigative files compiled for law enforcement purposes,
and information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.1
2
It is apparent from the provisions of both the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and the Administrative Procedure Act that Congress itself has
recognized at least the occasional necessity of executive secrecy. Congress
expressly provided, however, that the exemptions from the Freedom of
Information Act do not justify the withholding of information from Con-
gress itself.'3 Nonetheless, the only instance in which members of Con-
gress have sought to use the affirmative provisions of the Act to compel
the production of documents from an executive agency resulted in a ded-
sion by the Supreme Court sustaining the agency's refusal to disclose,
on the ground that the documents were covered by the foreign affairs
exemption.' 4  That decision rested on the language of the Act and did
not purport to speak to the broader question of the constitutional boun-
daries of executive privilege. Individual members of Congress were su-
ing in their private capacities; the power of Congress to override a mode
of secrecy which it had itself created was not at issue, nor did the execu-
tive agency claim a privilege to override Congress.
Each of the last three presidents has made a formal commitment to
Congress not to invoke executive privilege without specific presidential
approval. 5 Most observers agree, however, that this commitment has
been reduced to a nullity by the simple bureaucratic expedient of evading
requests for information without resorting to claims of executive privi-
lege. So common are these tactics, Senator Fulbright recently pointed
out, that "[a]s matters now stand, that commitment has been reduced
to a meaningless technicality; only the President may invoke executive
privilege but just about any of his subordinates may exercise it-they
"15 U.S.C. §552 (1970).
12 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (5), (6), and (7) (1970).
13 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970) provides as follows: "This section does not authorize with.
holding of information or limit the authority of records to the public, except as specifically
stated in this tection. This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress."
14Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See text accompany-
ing notes 49-51 inIra.
15 Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the judiciary, concerning Executive Priilege: The Vitbholdibg of Information by
the Executive, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, at 2-3 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hear-
ings].
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withhold information as they see fit but they do not employ the forbidden
words."'6
Information is withheld from Congress on at least three levels. At
the highest level are the few instances in which the President himself
personally directs a subordinate not to comply with a congressional re-
quest. More frequent are occasions when executive departments formally
decline on their own initiative to cooperate with congressional inquiries,
and the President does not direct them to do otherwise.17 The third
and most frequent way in which information is withheld are the count-
less struggles between congressional staffs and the lower levels of the
federal bureaucracy over information to which no colorable claim of priv.
ilege could attach, but which is nevertheless withheld because of the
general climate of secrecy and self-protection in which the executive
branch operates in its relations with Congress.' 8
16 Hearings on S. 858, S. Con. Res. 30, S.J. Res. 72, S. 1106, S. 1142, S. 1520, S. 1923
and S. 2073 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and
Subcomms. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, concerning Executive Privilege, Secrecy
in Government, Freedom of Information, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, at 74 (1973) there.
inafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
17 In March 1970, for example, the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee began
a two year probe of the Army's surveillance of domestic politics. In the ensuing war of at.
trition which was waged by the Pentagon, three generals, the Secretary of the Army, its gen-
eral counsel and several of their subordinates declined to testify or respond in writing to
questions about the scope and basis of the Army's surveillance Activities. At the same time
they delayed for more than three months in complying with a request from the subcom-
mittee for certain documents and computerized surveillance records compiled by the Army
and disseminated widely to other agencies of the government.
The Army's excuses for not complying with these requets were an awesome display
of the arsenal of executive secrecy. Documents and witnesses were withheld for fear of
prejudicing current departmental investigations into the very subject of the congressional
probe. The generals were shielded at first because they were stationed overseas, and later
because the Secretary of Defense determined they were not the proper persons to speak
for the Department on the "broader issues" facing the subcommittee, notwithstanding their
personal knowledge and direction of the Army's surveillance operations. A further reason
for not producing the generals was the Army's assertion that it is the policy of the executive
branch not to present intelligence personnel before congressional subcommittees.
A copy of the computer printouts which formed the bulk of the surveillance product
was withheld from the subcommittee long after the Army claimed that it had ordered the
destruction of the printouts and discontinued collection of most of the information. Among
the reasons given were that release of the documents would violate the privacy of persons
whose names appeared on them, although the subcommittee had guaranteed that names
would be eliminated prior to publication. When part of the printout was finally released
after eighteen months of tactical maneuvering by both sides, the Army classified it confi-
dential, and at first applied the same classification to the subcommittee's reports, so that
it was not published until more than two and one-half years after the investigation began.
See Testimony of Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. and Hon. John V. Tunney, 1971 Hearings 381-
420.
18 A startling example of the obstacles encountered at this third level of informal "priv-
ilege" was the experience of a bipartisan group of 130 Congressmen in attempting between
1966 and 1968 to compile an exhaustive list of federal assistance programs. The resistance
of the administering agencies was often bizarre: the telephone directory of the Office of
Economic Opportunity was at first withheld because' it was classified "confidential;" and
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Executive privilege is at once the most refined form of government
secrecy and the most direct executive challenge to Congress. Not only
does executive privilege often interfere with the legislative work of Con-
gress, but it has increasingly come to symbolize the troubled relations
between Congress and the President and to identify their points of sharp-
est conflict.
C. Congress and the White House Tapes
On July 23, 1973, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities took the extraordinary step of directing a subpoena duces
tecum to the President. At issue were the tapes of certain conversations
between President Nixon and his former top aides, purportedly about
the Watergate case.
None of Richard Nixon's thirty-six predecessors in office ever faced
such a dramatic confrontation with Congress, short of an impeachment
proceeding. Furthermore, the President also faced a subpoena from for-
mer Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, whose request for the tapes "as
material and important evidence" in forthcoming criminal proceedings
had also been denied.1 Since these subpoenas were issued in the wake
of an emphatic refusal by the President to surrender the tapes on the
ground of executive privilege, a constitutional crisis loomed in the court
tests ahead.
In both cases the President declined to comply with the subpoenas,
initially on identical grounds which he set forth succinctly in a letter
to the District Court:
I follow the example of a long line of my predecessors as President of
the United States who have consistently adhered to the position that the
President is not subject to compulsory process from the Courts.20
Thereafter, the Senate Committee voted unanimously to apply for an or-
der requiring production of the tapes, and the grand jury hearing evi-
dence in the Watergate cases instructed the Special Prosecutor to do like-
current eligibility requirements for certain programs were withheld because, in the words
of one particularly stubborn bureaucrat, "the programs and their personnel change so rapid-
ly." See Testimony of Hon. William V. Roth, Jr., 1971 Hearings 227-40.
19 In the exchange of public statements which preceded the subpoenas, the parties staked
out virtually irreconcilable positions. The President in a letter to Senator Ervin claimed
that the tapes "contain comments that persons with different perspectives and motivations
would inevitably interpret in different ways," asserting that "[t]hey arc the clearest possible
example of why Presidential documents must be kept confidential." Senator Ervin, in re-
spouse, honed in on what he saw as a fatal inconsistency in the President's position: "If
you will notice, the President says he has heard the tapes, or some of them, and they
sustain his position. But he says he's not going to let anybody else hear them for fear
they might draw a different conclusion." New York Times, July 24, 1973, at 19, col. .
2 0 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1973).
1974]
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wise. In the ensuing litigation the Special Prosecutor prevailed on the
merits, but the Senate Committee failed to establish a jurisdictional basis
for its suit and was forced to return to Congress to obtain express statu.
tory authority to enforce its subpoenas.'
Despite these different results, the Committee's claim was at least as
strong on its merits as the Special Prosecutor's. The Congress is exercis.
ing an implied constitutional power when it seeks information from the
Executive. 22  A prosecutor, however, is an executive official whose func.
tioning is subject to the ultimate discretion of the President.23  Although
the President may argue that the separation of powers insulates the Exec.
utive from incursions by the legislative and judicial branches, we shall
see that such insulation is at best severely limited by "[t]he power of the
Congress to conduct investigations [which] is inherent in the legislative
process. '24  Furthermore, the denial of information to Congress must,
finally, be regarded as a more serious threat to the balance of government
than the denial of evidence to a prosecutor, because the Congress can
neither legislate, nor investigate, nor impeach, if it lacks information to
determine when to exercise these political powers, which ultimately are
the only effective checks on a runaway Executive.
II. THE CLAIM OF A DISCRETIONARY ExEcuTivIi
PRIVILEGE TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM CONGRESS
A claim of absolute presidential discretion to withhold information
was forcefully advanced in the briefs submitted by the President's counsel
in the White House Tapes Case. Counsel offered three interrelated argu-
21 Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
The Committee relied on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 and 1361, and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 to
establish jurisdiction, but the District Court rejected each as a statutory basis, on the grounds
that (1) $10,000 was not at issue; (2) the suit could not be brought under the name
of the United States unless authorized by an act of Congres:;; (3) the duty to give informa.
tion is not a ministerial duty of the President, and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1361 did not
apply; and (4) the President is not an "agency" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701
(Administrative Procedure Act).
But see Pub. L. No. 93-190, infra, text accompanying notes 118-19.
2 2 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v. Dougherty,
273 U.S. 133, 175 (1927). See infra, text accompanying notes 65-67.
.23 This was dramatically illustrated by the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
on Saturday, October 28, 1973. Although this presidential action was accomplished at the
cost of the resignation of Attorney General Ellio't Richardson and the firing of his deputy,
William Ruckelshaus, and was subsequently held to have been in violation of the Justice
Department Regulations governing the Special Prosecutor'. office, Nader v. Bork,, 366 F
Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973), Cox's discharge took place in the absence of any legislation creat-
ing an independent prosecutor and was therefore arguably within the constitutional authority
of the President.
24Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). See infra, text accompanying
notes 65-67.
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ments: (1) the nature of the presidency-as chief of state, the President
is a symbol of the nation, and the criminal law cannot reach the individ-
ual serving as President until after he has been impeached by the House
and convicted by the Senate; (2) the need for confidentiality-the Presi-
dent's effectiveness in office depends in part upon the candor of his advis-
ors, who act as his "eyes, ears, mouth, and arms," and confidentiality
is required to generate candor; and (3) separation of powers-the
branches of government are coequal and the President must control his
own house.25
These arguments were a refinement of the Nixon Administration's
earlier position on executive privilege. Former Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst, speaking for the Administration in April 1973, asserted that
the Congress had no power to order an employee of the executive branch
to supply information if the President barred his testimony. Kleindienst
claimed that the President's judgment on whether or not to produce docu-
ments or witnesses for the Congress was final, that the decision was his
alone to make, and that neither the Congress nor the courts had constitu-
tional authority to interfere. 6
It was not always so. Even while the executive branch during pre-
vious administrations was asserting a broad privilege, there were many
attempts to define its limits and a hesitancy to proclaim an unreviewable
presidential discretion. The first major assertion of executive privilege
during the modern era came in 1941 when Attorney General Robert
Jackson declined to comply with a request by the House Committee on
Naval Affairs to inspect F.B.I. reports on the strikes and labor disputes
then plaguing defense industries and jeopardizing the war effort. In a
letter to the Committee chairman, Jackson observed that the documents
"can be of little if any value in connection with the framing of legisla-
tion or the performance of any other constitutional duty of Congress,"27
2 5 Brief of Petitioner at 10-53, Nixon v. Sirica, 42 U.S.LW. 2211 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12,
1973).
2 6 Statement of Richard G. Kleindienst, 1973 Hearings 24-26.
The Kleindienst position was enunciated just before the main Watergate disclosures began
to occur, and it had the effect of temporarily insulating the President's White House advisors
from Senator Ervin's Committee. One month later, however, after the resignations of the
principal White House advisors and the Attorney General, and in face of growing pressures
from Congress and the press for more information from the White House, a more modest
position on executive privilege was announced by Leonard Garment, the new Counsel to
the President. The new policy permitted the testimony by any executive department em-
ployee, including past and present members of the President's staff, but it prevented disclosure
to Congress or the courts of any conversations with the President, documents received or
produced by the President or any member of the White House staff in connection with
his duties, and classified information. Any exercise of the privilege would continue to be
at the President's unreviewable discretion. See 1973 Hearings 276-77.
27 Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative Reports, 40 OP. ATr'Y
GEN. 45 (1941). See also 1971 Hearings 576.
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but he did not assert an unreviewable executive power to withhold infor-
mation from Congress. That claim was reserved for a later day.
On May 17, 1954, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Defense
Secretary Charles Wilson, with an accompanying memorandum from At-
torney General Herbert Brownell, directing the Secretary to order his sub-
ordinates not to testify before Senator Joseph McCarthy's subcommittee.
However laudable its purpose, the Brownell memorandum had a negative
impact on the doctrinal development of executive privilege.2 According
to.Attorney General William Rogers, Brownell's successor, heads of de-
partments
. .have frequently obeyed congressional demands ...and have fur-
nished papers and information to congressional committees, [but] they
have done so only in a spirit of comity and good-will, and not because
there has been an effective legal means to compel them to do so.80
Perhaps because the presidency and the Congress were controlled by
the same political party, the issue lay largely dormant during the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations, although President Kennedy in his own
name once exercised the privilege, and executive departments and agen-
cies did so three times during each of the Democratic administrations.
The subject matters that have been included in executive privilege
as it has been broadly asserted during the last two decades have not var-
ied much since the Eisenhower Administration. In a memorandum fre-
quently cited by succeeding Attorneys General, Attorney General Rogers
in 1958 identified at least five categories of executive information privi-
leged from disclosure to Congress:
1. military and diplomatic secrets and foreign affairs;
2. information made confidential by statute;
3. investigations relating to pending litigation, and investigative
files and reports;
4. information relating to internal government affairs privileged
from disclosure in the public interest; and
5. records incidental to the making of policy, including interde-
partmental memoranda, advisory opinions, recommendations of subordi-
nates and informal working papers.31
28Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges Involving: Secretary of
the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G. Adams, H. Struve Hensel and Senator Joe McCarthy,
Roy M. Cohn and Francis P. Carr, Hearings before Specid Subcomm, on Investilgatlon,
Sen. Comm. on Gov't. Operations, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. at :1169-72 (1954).
29 Indeed, it became the basis for an unprecedented 34 claims of privilege during the
remaining five years of the Eisenhower Administration. CONG. Rigc. H2244 (daily ed, Mar.
28, 1973).
30 Memorandum of Atty. Gen. Rogers submitted to Subcomm. on Constlttonal Righit
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 6 (1958), reprinted in Rogers,




In the remainder of this article we shall first express our reasons
for concluding that the assertion of a discretionary executive privilege
by the President is without basis in historical or judicial precedent. We
shall also discuss the extent to which a president may claim confidential-
ity. Two of the three principal categories of privileges2-foreign and
military affairs and investigatory files and litigation materials-while rais-
ing issues about the propriety and scope of executive secrecy, can be ex-
plained and defined wholly apart from a constitutional privilege. A third
category--internal advice within the executive branch-raises more dif-
ficult problems. While there may be a necessity for executive secrecy
in this area, it is based on the same limited constitutional premise that
justifies secrecy among members of Congress and judges as well as execu-
tive officials: each branch of government has an implied power to protect
its legitimate decision-making processes from scrutiny by other branches.
We shall see that this does not mean the Executive (or the other
branches) can keep secret its actual decisions or the facts underlying them,
as distinguished from "advice," nor can it shield criminal wrongdoing by
its officials or employees.
III. THE UNTENABILITY OF A DISCRETIONARY
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
It is essential to emphasize the precise question before us, which
is not whether there are certain types of information that the Executive
needs to keep secret in order to function properly. This can be readily
conceded. Nor is the question whether the Congress generally requires
access to information in the hands of the Executive in order to legislate
properly. Again, this proposition is self-evident. The issue is whether
the President has the implied authority under the Constitution to with-
hold data from the Congress solely in his discretion, or whether his deci-
sion to do so is subject to constitutional limitation and judicial review.
A. The Practice of Early Presidents
The issue of executive privilege was raised in a tentative way during
the first presidency. President Washington at least once questioned the
3 2 Dean Roger Cramton, Former Assistant Attorney General in the Nixon Administration,
has asserted that executive privilege is most frequently and justifiably exercised in only three
areas: (1) military and foreign affairs; (2) investigatory files of law enforcement agencies;
and (3) testimony of presidential advisors. Dean Cramton's one deviation from the position
of Attorneys General Roger and Brownell was his limitation of the privilege to advisors to
the President. See Congress and the President: Executive Privilege in Past and Present,
Speech by Roger C. Cramrton, Dean-Elect, Cornell Law School and former Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, at Cornell Law School (March 14,
1973).
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authority of Congress to demand documents, but Washington eventually
complied with the requests of Congress and never directly confronted
the legislature with a refusal to disclose.83
It was not until the presidency of Jackson-a full 46 years after
the formation of the Republic and the enactment of the initial statute
authorizing congressional inquiries into the workings of the executive
branch-that there was an unequivocal assertion of discretionary power
to withhold information from the Congress. In 1835 Jackson rejected
a request for information, made during a hearing to confirm one of his
nominees, regarding "frauds in the sale of public lands" because he said
(1) the information was to be used by Congress in secret session and
thereby would deprive a citizen of the "basic right" of a public investiga-
tion, and (2) the inquiry was not "indispensable to the proper exercise
of Congress' powers." The first point related not to presidential preroga-
tives but to the separate question of the rights of individuals. The second
point at most assumes a limited sphere of executive privilege, particularly
when considered in the context of a statement made by Jackson one year
earlier:
Cases may occur in the course of its legislative or executive proceedings
in which it may be indispensable to the proper exercise of its powers
that it (Congress] should inquire or decide upon the conduct of its Pres-
ident or other public officers, and in every case its constitutional right to
do so is cheerfully conceded.34
During this same period a congressional practice developed of extend-
ing to the President a privilege or discretion to withhold certain investiga-
tive reports and state secrets from public disclosure. In the instances
where the offer extended by Congress was actually accepted by the Presi-
dent and documents were withheld, the congressional power to compel
3
3The one denial of a request for information by President Washington-a request
from the House of Representatives for all papers related to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty
-was based on Washington's belief that the House lacked the power under the Constitution
to demand documents related to the treaty-making power. The President conceded that
the Senate could receive the documents. Both Washington, and later Adams, freely com-
municated to the House all informationon external relations, including instructions to envoys
negotiating treaties when such information might be relevant to Congress' war-making pow.
ers. See Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, (pt. 1), 12 U.C.L.A. L. RIIV.
1043, 1079-80, 1085-93 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
34 Id. at 1095. Moreover, Jackson's nominee was not confirmed.
A similar incident involving President Tyler about a decade later is also indedsive. In
1843 Tyler questioned the right of Congress to certain reports relating to alleged fraud
on the Cherokee Indians, asserting in a memorandum to Congress that there was a narrow
area of information, of the type private litigants could withhold, that the Executive was
not compelled to disclose. He disavowed-albeit in ambiguous language-an absolute discre.
tion in complying with congressional requests. In fact, Tyler eventually made avallablt
all investigative reports on the incidents except the purely advisory opinions of his Investiga,
tion of the Cherokee delegates. Id. at 1096-98.
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their release was explicitly recognized by both parties. When Jefferson
declined, for example, to produce certain information on the Burr con-
spiracy in 1807, he was acting upon a House request that excepted "such
[information] as he may deem the public welfare to require not to be
disclosed ... ",5
The historical record is less than conclusive, and is subject, of course,
to different interpretations." Nonetheless, an investigation of presiden-
tial statements and actions in the seventy-five years following the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution does not support an inference that the early Pres-
idents or their subordinates believed they possessed a discretionary power
to withhold information from Congress. In virtually every incident in-
volving executive privilege prior to the Civil War, presidents complied
substantially with congressional requests, withholding information only
if explicitly authorized to do so by the Congress.
B. Judicial Precedent
The judicial record is equally barren of authority sustaining broad
claims of the Executive.37  President Nixon's brief to the Court of Ap-
peals contesting the Special Prosecutor's right to demand Watergate re-
lated tapes cites only two Supreme Court cases in support of a discretion-
ary executive privilege.38  The first of these, Alarbury v. Madison,"' is
inapposite. Admittedly, there is language in Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion which indicates that there is an area in which the Executive has
considerable discretion.40  Marshall, however, expounded the judiciary's
authority to review all executive acts not constitutionally committed to
executive discretion and to determine which issues are precluded from
review. While it is true that investigation of the Executive's act is "pe-
culiarly irksome, as well as delicate," the courts in Marshall's view had
35 Rogers, supra note 30, at 944.
30 See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and 487 F.2d 700, 775-
81 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
3 7 Although no Supreme Court case explicitly rejects such a privilege, there are no deci-
sions in this country or in England that recognize it The Queen's Bench in 1845, for
example, established what is still the rule in England today: "the Commons are . . . the
general inquisitors of the realm. . . . They may inquire into everything which it concerns
the public weal for them to know." Howard v. Gossett, 116 Eng. Rep. 139, 147 (Q.B.
1845).
3 8 Brief for Petitioner at 25, Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
09 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4 0 
"By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain impor-
tant political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is account-
able only to his own country in his political character, and to his own conscience." Id. at
165-66,
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the authority and indeed the duty to undertake such investigation." The
second case cited in the President's brief, Kendall v. United States ex
rel. Stokes,42 contains dicta43 about the discretionary powers of the Presi-
dent, but the Court's holding that a mandamus could issue to a presiden-
tially appointed executive official to compel him to perform a ministerial
act lends no support to a claim of executive privilege.
The most comprehensive attempt to muster judicial authority on be-
half of executive privilege, prior to the White House Tapes Case, had
been made by Attorney General Robert Jackson in his 1941 letter to
the House Committee on Naval Affairs.4 While some of the cases cited
by Mr. Jackson might support a limited power to withhold national se-
curity data and confidential informers' communications from the courts,
none lends credence to a discretionary privilege of the kind recently urged
by the executive branch. 4" As stated by the Court of Appeals in the
Tapes Case:
We of course acknowledge the long-standing judicial recognition of
Executive privilege .... However, counsel for the President can point to
no case in which a court has accepted the Executive's mere assertion of
privilege as sufficient to overcome the need of the party subpoenaing the
documents. To the contrary, the courts have repeatedly asserted that the
applicability of the privilege is in the end for them and not the Executive
to decide.40
41 Id. at 169-70.
42 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
43 "The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived
from the Constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode
prescribed by the Constitution through the impeaching power." Id. at 610.
44 40 Op. ArT'Y GEN. 45 (1941). See text accompanying note 27, suprd. Also quoted
in 1971 Hearings 573.
45 The first case cited, Marbury v. Madison, it has been seen, does not support the
claims of an unreviewable executive discretion. The second case, Totten v. United States,
92 U.S. 105 (1875), did not involve executive privilege at all, but rather a secret contract
between President Lincoln and a spy. The court refused to permit a suit based on the
contract because acknowledgement of the contract was in itself a breach of its terms.
In the Aaron Burr case, President Jefferson eventually complied with a subpoena to
produce a letter sent to him and left it to the court to suppress those parts of the letter
not material to Burr's defense. In his opinion in the Burr case Chief Justice Marshall
recognized a limited state secrets privilege, but he emphasized that the court must be satisfied
that the need for secrecy outweighs the accused's interest in having access to the document,
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (1807).
Of the remaining federal cases cited in the Jackson letter, all but one involved either
the Government's right to protect the identity of informers and their confidential communi-
cations, or the right of government employees to refuse to disclose information pursuant
to a regulation specifically authorized by Congress.
Two of the three state cases cited in the Attorney General's letter refer to an executive
discretion to appear or furnish papers to a court. But these same cases explicitly subject
this discretion to judicial review and recognize the legislature's power to require executive
disclosure.
4GNixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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On the other hand, there are several decisions which specifically rec-
ognize the prerogative of the courts to determine the parameters of execu-
tive privilege. In United States v. Reynolds,47 for example, the widow
of a civilian killed in the crash of an Air Force plane testing secret elec-
tronic equipment, sought copies of the Air Force investigative reports,
which the Secretary of the Air Force claimed were privileged documents.
The Supreme Court agreed that the materials were privileged, but ex-
pressly stated that it was the responsibility of the court to determine the
validity of the claim.48
Similarly, in Environmental Protection Agency v. A link,4' a suit
brought by members of Congress under the Freedom of Information
Act50 to force disclosure of various documents concerning an underground
nuclear test, the Supreme Court held that in camera inspection was not
justified if the government satisfied the court that the documents were
privileged because they were classified.5 '
In an apparent effort to reconcile the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Freedom of Information Act in Mink with the necessity for
47 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
48The Court offered the following guidelines for the treatment of claims of privilege:
In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far
the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the priv-
ilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of
privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that mili-
tary secrets are at stake.
Id. at 6-11.
49410 U.S. 73 (1973).
50 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
51 The Court based its opinion on the express language of subsection (b)(1) of the Act.
It also held that documents claimed to be exempt as internal memoranda (under subsection
(b) (5)) could be reviewed in camera. In an earlier case the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit had ordered in camera inspection to separate privileged and non-priv-
ileged material, based on the following rationale:
The view of this Court is determined by fundamental legal principles, and prin-
cipally the root conception of the rule of the law in our democratic society. An es-
sential ingredient of our rule of law is the authority of the courts to determine
whether an executive official or agency has complied with the Constitution and with
the mandates of Congress which define and limit the authority of the executive.
Any claim to executive absolutism cannot override the duty of the court to assure
that an official has not exceeded his charter or flouted the legislative will.
Of course the court exercises its authority with due deference to the position of
the executive. It will take into account all proper considerations, including the
importance of maintaining the integrity of executive decision-making processes. But
no executive official or agency can be given absolute authority to determine what
documents in his possession may be considered by the court in its task. Otherwise
the head of an executive department would have the power qn his own say so to
cover up all evidence of fraud and corruption when a federal court or grand jury
was investigating malfeasance in office, and this is not the law.
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793-94 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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judicial review of the Executive's use of privilege, a Court of Appeals
ordered a two step procedure in Vaughn v. Rosen.5 2 The suit arose out
of the efforts of a law professor to obtain reports of the Bureau of Per-
sonnel Management of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission
in a conclusory affidavit declared that the documents were privileged un-
der various exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act, and the dis-
trict court entered summary judgment for the defendant. The circuit
court, however, held that conclusory affidavits were insufficient to sustain
the assertion and required that the Commission set forth a separate basis
in fact for each claim of privilege. If analysis of the claims of privilege
and the materials offered by the government were to become too burden.
some, the district court could appoint a special master to assist with the
procedure. The Vaughn decision reformulated, in the context of the Free-
dom of Information Act,53 the well settled principle that "judicial control
over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers." 54
C. Separation of Powers
Neither historical nor judicial precedent supports a discretionary exec-
utive privilege, but it is nonetheless important to confront the argument
that such a privilege is necessary to protect the power of the Executive
and is therefore mandated by the doctrine of separation of powers. Con-
trary to the view of some recent Presidents and their legal advisors, our
understanding of the scheme and meaning of the Constitution suggests
a strict limitation of the privilege. Three distinct facets of the separation
of powers are involved, none of which supports executive discretion with
respect to Congressional requests for information.
1. Congressional Investigative Power
The first is the power of the Congress under Article I of the Constitu-
tion to conduct investigations. Long before 1789 it was perceived that
the English Parliament would be a mere appendage of ministerial govern-
-ment if it could not compel executive officers to explain their policies
and reveal the facts on which those policies were based. Parliament
did not merely seek explanations; it actively inquired, in the words of
Pitt the elder, "into every step of public management, either Abroad or
52484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 42 U.S.LW. 3523 (March 19, 1974).
53 Judge Wilkey who wrote the opinion in Vaughn dissented in the tapes decislon,
According to Wilkey Mink and Vaughn were merely inteipretations of the Freedom of
Information Act and did not involve a constitutional privilege. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
54 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
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at H6me, in order to see that nothing has been done amiss."55  From
the early seventeenth century this investigative power was very broad;
in each instance of its use Parliament itself would determine the scope
of its inquiry.5 6
Legislative practice in the American colonies followed the parliamen-
tary model.57  Most state Constitutions codified the legislative power to
investigate in highly specific provisions. 5 So deeply rooted was this leg-
islative right of access to executive documents that the Continental Con-
gress refused to create a Secretary of Foreign Affairs until a resolution
was adopted that "any member of Congress shall have access [to 'all
... papers of his office']: provided that no copy shall be taken of matters
of a secret nature without the special leave of Congress."59
While there is no express mention in the federal constitution of a
congressional power to investigate and gain access to the documents of
executive departments, the practice was so well established by 1789 that
such a power was assumed to be a fundamental legislative attribute."0
In one of its first enactments, on September 2, 1789, Congress spelled
out the reach of this implied power over the new Treasury Department
by passing a statute which remains on the books today:
[It] shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury... to make re-
ports, and give information to either branch of the legislature in person
5 5 Berger, supra note 33, at 1058.
5 6 Perhaps the most dramatic example of an early parliamentary investigation was the
inquiry into the administration of Robert Walpole during the two decades prior to his
fall from power in 1742. The investigation was conducted in a climate of international
and domestic crisis hardly conducive to parliamentary initiative. As Raoul Berger has noted
in emphasizing the significance of this inquiry as a measure of Parliament's historic power
to investigate:
The times were stormy; England was at war with Spain; the opposition rattled the
bones of disrupted continental alliances; they raised the dread of civil war and they
played a tattoo on the multitudinous dangers that would flow from a parliamentary
inquiry. But to no avail. Member after member spoke for the right and the duty
to inquire into the conduct of the administration and its ministers "from the lowest
to the highest.
Id. at 1057.
57 Examples abound of investigations by colonial assemblies "into the conduct of other
departments of government." Id. at 1058. Typical was a resolution of the Pennsylvania
Legislature in 1770 "orderfing] the assessors and collectors of Lancaster County to appear
before the audit committee and to bring with them their books and records for the preceding
ten years." Id. at 1059.
58An example of such provisions is to be found in Article X of the Maryland Constitu-
tion of 1776, which gave the legislature authority to "call for all public or official papers
and records, and send for persons, whom they may judge necessary in the course of inquiries
concerning affairs related to the public interest." Id. at 1059.
59 Id.
6 0 The Supreme Court has noted that, "The power of inquiry-with power to enforce
it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. It was so regarded
and employed in American legislatures before the Constitution was framed and ratified."
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927).
19741
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
or in writing (as he may be required), respecting all matters referred to
him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain
to his office. . . .1
This statute was drafted by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton,
hardly an advocate of limited executive powers. Whether or not he an-
ticipated that its "sweeping mandate . . . wholly without limitation
[would] fasten onto every conceivable activity of the Administration,"'
he could not have been blind to the fact that the statute gave the Secre-
tary no discretion to withhold information.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Congress conducted
continuous investigations into the expenditure of public funds in virtually
every area of government activity. The authority underlying these in-
vestigations was derived both from the appropriations clause in Article
I of the Constitution and from Hamilton's Treasury Reporting Act of
1789.3 Congressional inquiries into the Executive were in fact so com-
mon during this period that one observer has commented wryly that
"Committees instituted inquiries, ran the eye up and down accounts,
pointed out little items, snuffed about dark corners, peeped behind cur-
tains and under beds and exploited every cupboard of the Executive
household. 0 4
An instructive definition of the scope of this investigating power is
to be found in Watkins v. United States,'; where Chief Justice Warren
said in 1957:
The power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legis-
lative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concern-
ing the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or
political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Govern-
ment to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.60
61 Star. 64-66 (1789), now 5 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. V. 1959-63).
62 Berger, supra note 33, at 1060, quoting L. KOHNING, THE INVISIBLE PRESIDENCY
58 (1960).
63 The range and depth of inquiry during this early congressional period can be illustrated
by some random examples of House investigations. During the early nineteenth century,
the House conducted broad inquiries into the operations of the Treasury Department (1800
and 1824), the War Department (1809 and 1832), government employees generally (1818),
the Post Office (1820 and 1822), the Bank of the United States (1832 and 1834), the
New York Customs House (1839), the conduct of Captain J.D. Elliott commanding a naval
squadron in the Mediterranean (1839), the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1849), and
the Secretary of the Interior (1850). Berger, supra note 33, at 1066, fn. 109.
64 Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47 CALIF. L.
REF. 3, 23 (1959).
65 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
o6 ld. at 187.
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The Watkins case is especially suggestive because it is chiefly remem-
bered, and rightly, as a decision restricting the power of Congress, and
in particular the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Chief
Justice Warren explicitly stated that
[B]road as is this power of [Congressional] inquiry, it is not unlimited.
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals
without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress.... Nor
is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency .... No inquiry is an
end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate
task of the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated
are indefensible.67
This is the sum total of the limitations expressed by the Chief Jus-
tice, and it is apparent that they do not lend support to a discretionary
privilege of the kind recently asserted by the Executive. Rather, these
limitations are designed to protect the rights of witnesses. It is of course
true that Wfatkins dealt with the power of Congress to obtain informa-
tion from a private individual, and it therefore would be disingenuous
to suppose that the Court was thinking of such recondite matters as exec-
utive privilege. Nonetheless, the Court's broad appraisal of congressional
power is consistent with history and with earlier judicial pronouncements.
2. Presidential Powers
The second aspect of separation of powers concerns the implications
of the President's power under Article II to "take care that the laws
be faithfully executed." It is this general constitutional provision on
which chief executives and their attorneys general have chiefly relied to
buttress their claims of unlimited discretionary privilege to withhold exec-
utive documents and witnesses from the Congress. Ultimately this is
a claim of inherent or implied power, because the language of the Consti-
tution does not explicitly authorize any such broad discretionary withhold-
ing.
To the extent that the executive branch has an implied power to
maintain confidentiality, it should be identical to the authority of the
judicial and legislative branches to protect their internal decisionmaking
processes. Certainly no branch of government can perform its assigned
constitutional function unless its employees freely voice opinions without
fear of external scrutiny. It does not follow, however, that the executive
power to maintain secrecy is inherently greater than that of the two other
coordinate branches of government, nor that the Executive has an unre-
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viewable discretion to withhold information from Congress in order to
frustrate the legislative power of investigation.
The Supreme Court has in the past considered and rejected a Presi-
dent's claim of inherent executive power. In the Steel Seizure Case 8
President Truman was denied the authority to seize steel mills during
the Korean War in order to maintain needed production. Justice Black
writing for the Court noted that "The Founders of this Nation entrusted
the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad
times."69 In a similar vein Justice Frankfurther',; concurring opinion re-
called the statement by Justice Holmes that "The duty of the President to
see that the laws be faithfully executed does not go beyond the laws.... .,10
It is unnecessary to accept Justice Black's broad assertions about the
lack of presidential power to reach a similar conclusion. In a separate
analysis in the same case, Justice Jackson distinguished three situations
-those in which the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, where his authority is at a maximum; those
in which Congress is silent, where the President can rely only on its
own powers, and frequently the result is uncertain; and those in which
"the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress." In the latter situation, according to Justice Jackson,
and at least two other Justices in the Steel Case, the President's power
"is at its lowest ebb." 71
The case of executive privilege is plainly of the third type. While
Congress has not legislated explicitly on the privilege, it has demonstrated
its intention to obtain all necessary information from the executive
branch in statutes going back to the Hamilton Treasury Reporting Act,
Hence, even employing the analysis of Justice Jackson, which is less re-
strictive of executive powers than is the opinion of Justice Black, the
President lacks the inherent and discretionary power of the sort being
claimed.
Two other considerations, one textual and one rooted in history, sup,
port this conclusion. The only reference in the text of the Constitution
is the power given to Congress to keep and publish Journals, except "such
parts as may in their judgment require secrecy. ' '72  The only reference
in the text to making information available to another branch of govern-
ment is the duty imposed on the President "from time to time to give




72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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to the Congress information on the State of the Union.""3 While noth-
ing definitive should be read into these clauses, their presence in the Con-
stitution supports legislative access to executive documents rather than
executive discretionary authority.
From a historical perspective it should be noted that the framers of
the Constitution, fresh from bouts with the English kings, were more
concerned about the dangers of presidential than congressional domina-
tion. Some recent writers have pointed to isolated evidence of the Fram-
ers' fear of the "despotic tendencies of the legislature," and of "legislative
tyranny. '7 4 Nevertheless, the historical evidence marshalled by Professor
Berger reveals a consensus in the Constitutional Convention and in the
early histories of state governments that " 'the executive magistracy' was
the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend of liberty.
"75
In the White House Tapes Case both the Special Prosecutor and the
President sought to muster historical arguments. 8 The opponents of the
discretionary privilege were more persuasive, as indicated by Judge Sirica's
opinion:
A search of the Constitution and the history of its creation reveals a
general disfavor of government privilege. Early in the Convention of
1787, the delegates cautioned each other concerning the dangers of lodg-
ing immoderate power in the executive department. This attitude per-
sisted throughout the Convention, and executive powers became a major
topic in the subsequent ratification debates. The Framers regarded the
legislative department superior in power and importance to the other
two . . . '7
Modern history suggests that the precautions taken by the nation's
founders to guard against executive abuses of power should not be re-
laxed today.78 Various aspects of the operation of the modern executive
branch serve to exacerbate the dangers of unchecked executive discretion.
73 U.S. CONST. art If, § 3.
74 Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960 (pt. 2)
29 GEO. WAsir. L. REV. 827, 905 (1961).
75 Berger, supra note 33, at 1070.
76See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Order to Produce Documents or Objects in
Response to the Subpoena at 34-35, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon,
360 F. Supp. 1 (1973); Brief of Petitioner at 10-27, Nixon v. Sirica, 42 LW. 2211 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 12, 1973).
7 7 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 4 (1973).
78 An experienced foreign observer, Louis Heren, has noted: "... the main difference be-
tween the modern American President and a medieval monarch is that there has been a steady
increase rather than diminution of his power. In comparative historical terms the United
States has been moving steadily backward." Quoted in Statement by Philip B. Kurland,
1971 Hearings 538.
Professor Kurland himself prophesized, without enthusiasm, that
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Particularly dangerous has been the vast expansion in the size and
role of the White House staff, and the recent practice of assigning one
person the dual role of cabinet officer and presidential advisor. The for-
mer problem is partly a matter of numbers. During 1971 Henry Kis-
singer directed a National Security Council staff of more than 140, of
whom 54 were substantive experts-a long way, indeed, from the small
and rather clubby retinue of earlier presidents .7 This situation is not, of
course, solely the result of action taken by the Nixon Administration;
the growth of the White House has been steady since the Roosevelt years.
As a result of this growth, the denial to Congress of the opportunity
to question members of the White House staff, in a formal way, regard-
ing their activities, knowledge, or opinions becomes increasingly impor-'
tant.
The problem of multiple executive responsibilities is even more seri-
ous. A cabinet member who is called to testify on the actions of his
department may be asked questions which touch upon his activities as ad-
visor to the President. Former Assistant Attorney General Roger Cramton
has stated that while the first "is a proper inquiry, the latter is subject
to a claim of executive privilege." He acknowledges, however, that "the
matters shade into one another and the distinction is difficult to maintain,
especially when a cabinet member is housed in the White House and
has a separate role as Counselor to the President on specified matters."8
These modern developments emphasize the intellectual difficulty of
accepting the President as final arbiter of the privilege issue. It is the
President who decides the size of the White House staff, the allocation,
of responsibilities between it and the cabinet departments, and whether
or not to fuse in one individual both line and staff assignments that
formerly were kept distinct. To permit the President also to determine,
finally, when an individual may be immunized from legislative questions
or a document sequestered is surely to defeat the goal of a balanced
federal government.
3. Judicial Power
To conclude our discussion of the separation of powers, it is necessary
to consider the proper role of the courts in resolving the problem of
We will continue . . . to see the President wage war without Congressional declar-
ation, to see executive orders substitute for legislation, to see secret executive agree-
ments substitute for treaties, and to see Presidential decisions not to carry out Con-
gressional programs under the label of "impoundment of funds."
Id. at 539. But see Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy, An Unresolved Consttulional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 476 (1957).
79 Statement of Hon. J. W. Fulbright, 1971 Hearings 21.
80 Speech by Roger C. Cramton, supra note 32.
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executive privilege. In our view, if an issue concerning the privilege
cannot be negotiated, it should be resolved by the Supreme Court."
Neither the President nor the Congress should be the judge in its own
cause. Accordingly, just as we deny the right of the President to deter-
mine the issue definitively, we also reject the assertion by Senator Ervin,
which he later qualified, that a congressional committee should be "the
final judge on whether a White House aide could refuse to answer any
of the committee's questions."82
The courts have a general responsibility to decide cases that involve
disputes over the allocation of power between the political branches of
the federal government. The Supreme Court, for example, in the mid-
nineteenth century ruled on the power of the President to order a block-
ade without Congressional approval,83 and during the Korean war it held
that the President lacked the power to seize private property without
Congressional authority.84
It is sometimes suggested that executive privilege controversies can
best be resolved by the accommodations and realities of the political pro-
cess rather than by formal judicial proceeding. Admittedly an informal
solution permits judicious leaks of information from the Executive to the
Congress that cannot be provided on the record, and encourages the fa-
miliar meetings between congressmen and presidential advisors at which
presumably valuable data is exchanged. 5 In short, the political give and
take allows flexibility that many regard as desirable. The difficulties with
this modus operandi include the tendency of such a surreptitious and
informal means of communication to demean the governmental process.
Information acquired in this way is not on the record, and therefore is
not usable in any stable way by other members of Congress or the public.
We agree with Justice Brandeis that "sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light is the best of policemen."8  The informal
leak and the Old School Tie are not satisfactory substitutes for open testi-
mony that the Executive must be able to defend publicly.
8 1 There are technical questions to be faced here-the existence of a case or controversy,
of proper standing, and of the possibility of a "political question" not meet for judicial
determination. Analysis of these questions we postpone until § V of this article.
8 2 N.Y. Times, April 19, 1973 at 1, col. 4.
83The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
84Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8 5 See, e.g., Testimony of Hon. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, 1971 Hearings
259-72.
86 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERs USE IT 92 (1914).
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IV. THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE ASSERTABLE
By THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
If our conclusion is correct that a discretionary executive privilege
is untenable, this does not foreclose the question whether secrecy can
properly be maintained by the executive branch in the three types of
cases where a privilege has most often been asserted: foreign and military
affairs, investigatory files and litigation materials, and advisory communi-
cations.
A. Foreign and Military Affairs
A degree of executive secrecy is probably necessary in foreign or mili-
tary affairs, as the Supreme Court asserted in its Curtiss-W/right decision. 87
Nonetheless, Ctngress must have access to foreign and military informa-
tion if it is to exercise its express constitutional powers under Article
I to advise the President in making treaties, to declare war, and to appro-
priate funds for raising and supporting armies.
Congress has already exercised its constitutional power to authorize
limited secrecy in the conduct of foreign and military affairs. The Free-
dom of Information Act, for example, incorporates by reference the pro-
visions of the executive order on classification of documents in exempt-
ing from its mandate matters "specifically required by Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."'18
This reference, however, does not mean that a constitutional authority
to classify information rests with the President alone. The Supreme
Court in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, while upholding
broad exemption from the Freedom of Information Act of information
classified by executive order, pointed out that "Congress could certainly
have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures [for clas-
sifying documents] or it could have established its own procedures .... "
Congress, therefore, is theoretically an active partner with the Presi-
dent not only in conducting foreign affairs, but also in maintaining a
system of confidentiality. This shared constitutional responsibility was
reflected in a recent recommendation by a House subcommittee chaired
87United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
885 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
89Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973).
In response to the decision in Mink restricting the availability of in camera inspection
under the Freedom of Information Act, bills were introduced in 1973 in both the House,
H.R. 5425, and Senate, S. 1142, which would require that in all cases involving contested
information, the district court's examination must include an examination in camera to deter-




by Congressman William Moorhead urging the establishment of an inde-
pendent Classification Review Commission to be composed of members
appointed both by Congress and by the Executive. In the view of the
committee chairman, the Commission
would have broad regulatory and quasi-adjudicatory authority over the
•.. dassification system. [I]t would also have the responsibility of set-
tling disputes between Congress and the Executive over access to both
classified and unclassified types of information requested by Congress.
90
The argument is often made that substantial breaches in security might
result from unimpeded congressional access to classified information. This
argument is not compelling. In the first place, the existing statutory
scheme is indicative of congressional self-restraint with respect to execu-
tive classification practices. Furthermore, the record of the executive
branch itself is far from exemplary in managing the classification system,
which is often put to political use to manipulate the Congress or public
opinion? 1
The Pentagon Papers are an example of the kind of information re-
lating to national defense which is improperly withheld from Congress
under a spurious claim of executive privilege. On December 20, 1969,
former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in a letter to Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee Chairman Fulbright explained that the documents
could not be made available to the Senate because they contained "an
accumulation of data of the most delicate sensitivity, including National
Security Council papers and other presidential communications which have
always been considered privileged."92  As Senator Fulbright responded,
this assertion of privilege illuminated Congress' waning foreign policy role-
If the Senate is to carry out effectively its Constitutional responsibilities
in the making of foreign policy, the Committee on Foreign Relations
90 Operation and Reform of the Classification System in the United States, A Paper
Delivered by Rep. William S. Moorhead, Chmn., Foreign Operations & Gov't. Info. Subcomm.,
Comm. on Gov't. Operations, U.S. House of Rep., at Center for Internat. Studies, N.Y.
Univ. (Feb. 24, 1973).
91 Congressman Moorhead summarizes the practice well:
On the one hand, the full power of the government's legal system is exercised
against certain newspapers for publishing portions of the "Pentagon Papers" and
against someone like Daniel Ellsberg for his alleged role in their being made pub-
lic. This is contrasted with other actions by top executive officials who utilize the
technique of "instant declassification" of information they want leaked. . . .Such
executive branch "leaks" may be planted with friendly news columnists. Or, the
President himself may exercise his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief to declassify
certain information in an address to the nation or in a message to Congress seeking
additional funds for a weapons system.
92 1971 Hearings 37-38.
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must be allowed greater access to background information which is avail-
able only within the Executive Branch than has been the case over the
last few years.93
In summary, there is probably a need for secrecy in foreign and mili-
tary affairs. This means that information properly classified pursuant
to statutory authority may be withheld in certain circumstances from the
general public and provided to reliable persons within the government
on a need to know basis. But this conclusion provides no justification
for denying Congress the foreign and military information it requires
in order to fulfill is constitutional responsibilities. Accordingly, Congress
has the power to compel production of such information by statute or
congressional resolution.
B. Investigatory Files and Litigation Materials.
The second major category of information frequently included under
the umbrella of executive privilege is information which the government
may have to produce in court-principally investigatory files and other
litigation materials. Roger Cramton recently described this as a "widely
accepted legitimate area of executive privilege," agreeing with Attorney
General Jackson that disclosure of investigatory files would prejudice law
enforcement, impede the development of confidential sources, and result
in injustice to innocent individuals.1 4
It is unnecessary to dispute the validity of these conclusions under
certain limited circumstances to demonstrate that investigatory and litiga-
tion files need not be protected from unwarranted disclosure to Congress
by anything so grand as an executive privilege. The government's law
enforcement interest, as well as the privacy of individuals under investiga-
tion, are amply safeguarded by common law evidentiary privileges, by
the statutory exemptions from the Freedom of Information Act, and by
the constitutional protections against self-incrimination and denial of free
speech and due process. Unlike a discretionary executive privilege, these
doctrines assimilate and attempt to balance competing interests in disclo.
sure which are frequently advanced by private litigants, by Congress and
by the public. Furthermore, it would be difficult to imagine a greater
inconsistency in the law than permitting a private litigant to compel the
disclosure of information from the Executive not accessible to Congress,
Yet this is precisely the effect of extending executive privilege into the
area of investigatory files and litigation materials.
93 Id. at 38. See also Affidavit of Max Frankel in New York Times v. United States,
403 U.S. 719 (1971).
94 Speech by Roger C. Cramton, supra note 32.
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The hallmark of the evidentiary privileges is that the judiciary and
not the executive determines when the circumstances are appropriate for
a governmental claim of privilege. To invoke the court's power to re-
view such a claim, a private litigant need only show, to the extent re-
quired by the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, that the
information he is seeking to discover is "relevant" to his criminal deiense
or civil claim.
If the information is demonstrably relevant, the litigant may seek
to have the court apply the following general rules in considering the
government's claim. First, the information at issue must be submitted
to the court for an in camera (but not necessarily ex parte) inspection
to determine whether it is properly covered by the privilege, and if so
whether the government's interest in non-disclosure outweighs the private
litigant's need for the information to prove his case. Where classified
information is not involved, the courts generally reject government claims
of a confidential privilege for any of the factual content of investigatory
reports. Second, if the information is not privileged, or if the litigant's
need for proof is greater than the government's interest in confidentiality,
the government can be compelled to choose between losing its case or
dropping its prosecution and producing the relevant documents which
it claims are privileged. 5
The Congress has demonstrated a sensitivity to the Executive's need
for confidentiality in this area by enacting exemptions to the Freedom
of Information Act which protect both "investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes," and "files the disclosure of which would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.""B It is signif-
icant that the application of these exemptions in cases where executive
agencies have sought to invoke them has been made by judicial interme-
diaries. Moreover, the agencies have the burden of proving that they are
95 The efficiency of this procedure was demonstrated in a recent district court decision,
Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 42 U.S.LW. 2314, Civil Action No.
846-73 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1973). The plaintiff in that action sought a tax refund and
a ruling that it was entitled to a charitable income tax exemption. The Internal Revenue
Service had refused to grant such a ruling under circumstances which suggested the possibility
of improper political influence. The plaintiff through discovery sought access to White
House, Treasury, and IRS files and obtained an appropriate discovery order from the court.
Defendants refused to comply with the order, making instead a conclusory and unsubstan-
dated claim of executive privilege, whereupon the court invoked the sanctions of Rule 37(b)
(2)(A) of-the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and held that for purposes of the case,
plaintiff's allegations would be accepted as established, thereby nullifying the validity of
the Internal Revenue Service Ruling.
Such a procedure is an appropriate solution for the usual civil case in which the govern-
ment is a party and the privilege issue arises in a discovery context. It is of little utility, how.
ever, in such litigation as the White House Tapes Cases, where the sole issue is whether the
Executive can be ordered to disclose contested documents or information.
96 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522(b) (6), (7) (1970).
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entitled to exemption under the Act, again in contrast to an unreviewable
claim of privilege by the Executive. The Executive, for example, often
claims that investigatory files are permanently exempt from disclosure
even if an investigation and prosecution have been completed-a claim
which the courts have rejected with equal frequency."
Independent of these evidentiary privileges and exemptions from the
Freedom of Information Act, there are a variety of important constitu-
tional guidelines for the conduct of legislative inquiries. These guide-
lines prescribe limits to avenues of investigatory inquiry, consistent with
the requirements of procedural due process and the privilege against self-
incrimination. They also establish an absolute bar against inquiries into
matters of belief protected by the First Amendment. As applied to the
use of investigatory information in congressional hearings, these princi-
ples can be summarized as follows: 8
1. Before airing defamatory, adverse or prejudicial information, a
committee should screen such material in executive session to determine
its reliability.
2. An individual whom information tends to prejudice should be
properly notified and given an opportunity to appear before the commit-
tee in executive session. He should be allowed to call supporting wit-
nesses if he so requests, and to produce other evidence in order to rebut
the prejudicial information. The same requirement of fair notice pertain-
ing to witnesses at public hearings should apply, including a ban on dis-
closure of the names of witnesses in advance of their appearance.
3. No information discussed at an executive session should be dis.
closed prior to public session, and any defendant prejudiced by unauthor-
ized disclosure should be entitled to dismissal of the indictment against
him.
4. If adverse testimony is given in public session after the commit-
tee has determined in executive session that it is vital to an investigation,
any person about whom such testimony is offered should be afforded an.
opportunity to:
(a) Testify or offer sworn statements in his behalf;
(b) subject a witness offering prejudicial testimony or documents
to cross-examination; and
(c) obtain the assistance of the committee in compelling the attend-
07 See, e.g., Getman v. N.L.R.B., 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin,
444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
M. A. Schapiro & Co. v. S.E.C., 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); Cooney v. Sun Ship.
building & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968). But see Weisberg v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) petition for certiorari pending, 42 U.S.L.W,
3434 (Jan. 21, 1974).98 See Policies # # 227-28, Policy Guide of the American Civil Libertiej Union (1973
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ance of witnesses and the production of documents reasonably necessary
to rebut the charges against him.
These constitutional principles, together with the evidentiary and In-
formation Act privileges, assure the protection of the investigatory process
and the privacy of persons under investigation. There is no need to
import an "executive privilege," whether or not discretionary, to achieve
the same ends.
C. Advice Within the Executive Branch
The remaining claim of privilege which must be examined relates
to the power to withhold communications or documents that relate sole-
ly to internal advice within the executive branch. The principal reason
for recognizing such a privilege as a necessary protection for the process
of governmental decision making is the undoubted fact that persons will
tend to be less candid in exchanging views and making recommenda-
tions if they know or fear that their ideas will be subject to later exami-
nation and possible public criticismf 9 There is no reason, however, that
such a privilege should be regarded as exclusively "executive." Insofar
as the privilege exists at all, it should apply equally to attempts to protect
advice that law clerks or legislative assistants provide to judges or mem-
bers of Congress. The principle involved is the necessity to protect the
delicate internal decision-making process of each branch of government.
From a pragmatic standpoint there seems to be merit in conceding
to the President the right in some situations to withhold advice, pro-
vided the power may be exercised only under carefully limited circum-
stances and is fully reviewable. The development of public policy will
arguably be inhibited if individuals in government cannot rely on the
confidentiality of their communicated opinions. A tragic example of
such inhibition was. the stagnation of American policy toward China in
the wake of the censorious treatment of China experts in the State De-
partment after the Communist regime came to power in 1949. To re-
quire all advice to be subject to potentially unfriendly scrutiny and mis-
interpretation would probably discourage candor and innovative ideas.
A second reason for protecting the advice that flows from one official
to another is based on the realities of power and personal vulnerability.
As stated by Professor Bishop:
It is one thing for a cabinet officer to defend a decision which, however
just, offends the prejudices of a powerful Congressman and, very prob-
ably, a highly vocal section of the public; it is quite another thing for a
99See Testimony of Hon. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, 1971 Headgs 259-
72,
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middle-aged, middle-ranking civil servant, who needs his job to do
So. 100
In many cases, though not all, it will be sufficient if the bureaucrat's
superior appears and testifies as to government decisions actually made.
Congress should usually be able to obtain the requisite information in
this fashion without injury to the reputation, sensibilities, or legal rights
of a lower echelon bureaucrat. If a privilege is admitted on practical
grounds to allow executive officers to decline to testify at the discretion
of the President, it should apply down the line to the lesser and weaker
members of the bureaucracy.
Assuming the existence of a privilege, it is important to determine
its scope and practical application. We have attempted, therefore, to
formulate a workable and coherent set of rules for applying the "advice
privilege" that could be the basis for legislation.10'
1. No witnesses summoned by a congressional committee may re-
fuse to appear on the ground that he intends to invoke the privilege
as to all or some of the questions that may be asked. 2
It has been suggested that certain officers in the executive branch-
notably those who are White House aides to the President-may decline
altogether to appear. This argument is based on the reasonable view
that a Chief Executive needs some intimate advisors with whom to share
private counsel entirely uninhibited by the risk of disclosure. 03
The difficulty is that we are no longer in an era when close personal
advisors act purely in a counseling capacity. Not only do some individ-
uals occupy dual positions of cabinet member; and advisors to the Presi.
dent, but it is apparent that all chief White House aides are action officers
as well as advisors. Accordingly, at least until we return to the days
of a few personal White House advisors, if a presidential assistant is
directed not to testify, he should make himself available to explain the
reasons for the refusal. Any other rule opens the door wide to unjustified
and even arbitrary assertions of privilege and to the denial to the legisla-
tive branch of information it rightfully seeks in order to carry out its
constitutional responsibilities.
2. a. The advice privilege may be claimed on behalf of a witness
100 Bishop, supra note 78, at 477-88.
101 Compare Report of Comm. on Civ. Rts. of the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., Executive Privilege: Analysis and Recommendations for Congressional Legislation, 29
THE REcORD 177-208 (1974).
102 See S. Con. Res. 30, 1973 Hearings 492-93.
103See NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SfECRECY IN AMERICA 53.55 (N,
Dorsen & S. Gillers eds.), to be published June 1974. (remarks by Burke Marshall),




summoned by a congressional committee only at the personal direction
of the President.
b. This privilege may be asserted only with respect to recom-
mendations, advice, and suggestions passed on to members of the execu-
tive branch for consideration in the formulation of policy.
c. A witness may not decline to answer questions about policy
decisions that he personally made or personally implemented. Whatever
the title of an individual, and whether or not he is called an "advisor,"
he should be accountable for actions that he took in the name of the
government and decisions that he made leading to action on the parts
of others.
d. A witness may not decline to answer questions about factual
information that he acquired while acting in an official capacity.
The separation of "fact" from "advice," while sometimes difficult, is
achievable. Indeed, executive departments are often required by the courts
to make this separation in order to comply with requests for documents
under the Freedom of Information Act and in other litigation. Without
this separation an advice privilege invites abuse. As one witness pointed
out in the 1971 Senate hearings on executive privilege, the protection
of "advice" is potentially "a most mischievous privilege:"
Virtually every scrap written in the executive branch can, if desired, be
labeled an internal working paper. Rarely are matters neatly labeled
"facts," "opinions," or "advice." It can be used as readily to shield
opinion corrupted by graft and disloyalty as to protect candor and honestjudgment. And it can be used as a "back door" device for withholding
state secrets and investigative reports from Congress.104
Of course, if facts within the personal knowledge of a witness, or
information relating to decisions that a witness personally made or imple-
mented, are "inextricably intertwined with policy-making processes,"'0 5
secrecy should prevail. But if the separation can be made, Congress is
entitled to the information not protected by executive privilege.
e. Executive privilege cannot be claimed as to material relating
to a President's role as leader of his political party, as distinguished from
his position as head of the executive branch of the government.
f. If the President or some other official has already made state-
ments about the matter under inquiry by the Congress, the privilege is
waived as to that subject. The potential net effect of selectively with-
holding information is to mislead the public as well as the legislative
branch.
104 Testimony of Professor Alvin C. Swan, 1971 Hearings 249.
105 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 92 (1973) quoting Mink v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 464 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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3. a. Documents may be withheld from Congress or a committee
of Congress only on the personal authorization of the President.
b. The privilege should extend not to entire documents but only
to those portions which meet the criteria justifying an exercise of the
advice privilege.
Ir the Mink case the Supreme Court declined to apply this discrimi-
nating rule with regard to classified documents because of the express lan-
guage of the Freedom of Information Act.1"" On the other hand, in
the Pentagon Papers case,10 7 where a constitutional claim against prior
restraints was presented, the Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment interests at stake were of such paramount importance that it de-
clined to excise any portions of the documents. It would probably have
been permissible for the President to have ordered purely advisory com-
munications among the Pentagon Papers to be withheld from Congress
if he had complied, as he should have, with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's earlier request for the documents in December 1969.
Executive privilege is inconsistent with constitutional principles un-
derlying the investigative power of Congress and the judicial reviewing
function of the Supreme Court. The executive branch is therefore on
weak ground in asserting that an entire document may be withheld solely
because a portion of the document contains "advice."
4. Whatever the effect of these rules in other circumstances, there
should be no executive privilege when the Congress has already acquired
substantial evidence that the information requested concerns criminal
wrong-doing by executive officials or presidential aides.10 8 There is ob-
viously an overriding policy justification for this position, since the op.
posite view would permit criminal conspiracies at the seat of government
to be shrouded by the veil of an advice privilege. While the risk of
abusive congressional inquiry exists, as the McCarthy experience demon.
strates, the requirement of "substantial evidence" of criminal wrong-doing
should guard against improper use of the investigative power.
In two 1972 cases the Supreme Court underscored its impatience
with claims of constitutional privilege, based on the separation of powers,
that shield investigations concerning "possible third party crime."'0 0  In
the first case, the Court ruled that Senator Mike Gravel's assistant could
10 Id. See text accompanying note 14, rupra.
10 7 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
108 In such situations, of course, individuals summoned before Congress are entitled to
exercise their constitutional rights such as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrlml.
nation. They might also, for example, seek to suppress wiretap evidence seized in violation
of their fourth amendment rights.




be compelled to testify about publication of the Pentagon Papers which
Senator Gravel had read on the Senate floor. Justice White, speaking
for himself and the four Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court, stated
that the Senator himself could be interrogated by a grand jury if his
sources of information related to crime. The Constitution "provides no
protection for criminal conduct threatening the security of the person or
property of others."110
The second Supreme Court case involved former Senator Daniel
Brewster of Maryland, who was prosecuted for having received a bribe
to influence his action on postal legislation. A lower court had held
that such an indictment was invalid because it put into question Brew-
ster's motives for legislative action-a subject that is constitutionally pro-
tected. The Court ruled, however, that "[tQaking a bribe is, obviously,
no part of the legislative process or function." ''
The Gravel and Brewster cases are powerful precedents because the
Supreme Court was dealing with an explicit constitutional immunity. In
setting forth the privileges of Senators and Representatives, article I, §
6 of the Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." There is no
such specific immunity based on executive privilege. It is therefore all
the more evident that the privilege, whatever its reach, should not permit
the Executive to withhold information concerning criminal conduct.
V. JUSTICIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT
Judicial resolution of disputes concerning executive privilege will en-
able these issues to be determined in a manner that will minimize polit-
ical considerations and establish precedent for the future. It is necessary,
therefore, to consider the context in which an issue of executive privilege
might be presented to the courts, the attendant problems of jurisdiction
and justiciability, and the ways in which a court might enforce a decision
on the merits.
A threshold question is how Congress itself might make a determi-
nation to submit the dispute to the courts. Not all congressional de-
mands for information are expressive of the will of Congress, or even
of a congressional committee, since many are pressed by individual mem-
bers solely for private political reasons. To ensure that the contested
information is sought pursuant to a formal legislative inquiry and thereby
to prevent unnecessary confrontations, some checks are essential. One
possibility would be a requirement that a legislative committee not seek
110 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 (1973).
111 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1973).
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judicial review of the Executive's assertion of privilege without the con-
currence of a majority of that committee's members. Since a committee's
request could be overruled by a vote of the full legislative body, a legis-
lative resolution supporting judicial review would present the clearest in-
dication of congressional will.11 2
Once a decision is made to seek a judicial resolution of the contro-
versy, the party bringing suit must establish that its claim is within the
jurisdiction of a federal court. The initial requirement, of course, is the
existence of an Article III case or controversy. Despite the apparent
incongruity of a suit between two branches of the federal government,
the interests of the parties in an executive privilege dispute are adverse.
One authority on executive privilege has properly cited the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. I.C.C."8 in pointing out the adversity
of the interests involved in similar disputes:
[When] the disputants are Congress and the executive it would be slicer
conceptualism to regard the United States as the domihum litis, for aside
from the "people" to whom an appeal on this issue is unfeasible and re-
mote, there exists no organ or body but the courts which can compel
them to reconcile their differences.' 14
In addition to the "case or controversy" requirement, Congress must
establish that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear
its claim. In the White House Tapes Case, Judge Sirica found that the
federal courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of executive privi-
lege within the context of a subpoena issued by the Special Prosecutor
acting with the authorization of a grand jury,"' but held that no such
jurisdictional basis exists for a civil action by a congressional commit-
11 A bill reflecting this approach was recently introduced by Senator Kennedy to author.
ize any Senate, House or joint committee to bring suit to contest claims of executive privilege.
The bill confers jurisdiction on district courts to hear such suits, voidable by any subsequent
expression of a contrary congressional intent:§ 3103, General
(b) A civil action brought by a joint committee of Congress or a committee of
either House of Congress shall be immediately dismissed with prejudice by the
district court if-(1) in the case of a civil action brought by a joint committee, Congress passes
at any time a concurrent resolution stating that it does not favor the bringing
of that action; or(2) in the case of civil action brought by a committee of either House of
Congress, that House of Congress passes a resolution at any time stating that
it does not favor bringing that action.
S. 2073, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3103 (1973). See 1973 Hearings at 537.
113 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
114 Berger, supra note 33, (pt. 2) at 1287.
115 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973),
aI'd sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 42 U.S.L.W. 2211 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 1973).
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tee." 6 As we have seen, the Senate Watergate Committee's suit to ob-
tain the tapes asserted four bases of jurisdiction, each of which was re-
jected by the district court." 7
Since Congress is constitutonally empowered to define the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, the congressional response to this rebuff was
S. 2641.118 This Act, which became law on December 18, 1973 without
presidential signature, confers original jurisdiction on the District of Co-
lumbia District Court,' without regard to the sum or value in controversy,
to entertain any civil action brought by the Committee to enforce or
secure a declaration concerning a subpoena or order seeking relevant in-
formation, documents or tapes from any members of the executive
branch.""
By drafting S. 2641 narrowly to meet the immediate exigencies of
the Senate Select Committee on Campaign Activities, the Senate may
have ensured its prompt passage, but it did little to solve the general
problem of jurisdiction to entertain questions of executive privilege. A
bill introduced by Senator Kennedy would, if enacted, avoid any future
question of a federal court's jurisdiction in a privilege controversy. The
bill provides that:
(a) The District Court for the District of Columbia shall have origi-
nal, exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action brought by either House of
Congress, a joint committee of Congress, or any committee of either
House of Congress with respect to any claim of executive privilege as-
serted before either such House or any such joint committee or commit-
tee.' 2 0
116 Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
117 The Committee claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, 28 U.S.C. § 1361,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06. See note
21, supra.
118Pub. L No. 93-190 (Dec. 18, 1973); 119 CoNG. REc. 20130-31 (daily ed. Nov.
9, 1973).
119 The District of Columbia District Court which ultimately considered the Committee's
suit under the new jurisdictional statute found that the Court had jurisdiction, but deter-
mined that the Committee was not entitled to the tapes. 42 U.S.L.W. 2435 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 8, 1974). See note 135, infra. A more drastic method of getting an executive privilege
issue before the courts than that which was utilized by Congress in the White House Tapes
Case would be "by the simple and forthright process of causing the Sergeant at Arms to
seize the offender and clap him into the common jail of the District of Columbia or the
guardroom of the Capitol police." Bishop, supra note 78, at 484 (1957). The prisoner's
ensuing petition for a writ of habeas corpus would then present an unavoidable occasion
for the courts to decide whether the executive had the authority to withhold the information
which precipitated the dispute. Before imposing legislative punishment the Congress would
have to give the "offender" due process-notice of the charge and an opportunity to appear
and defend against it. If Congress were upheld, the "offender" would remain in custody
until he testified, or procured the document in question, or until the end of the session
of Congress.
120 S. 2073, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., § 1364. See 1973 Hearings at 534-35. See note
112 supra.
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Once the constitutional and statutory prerequisites to jurisdiction are
satisfied, several further hurdles remain before a decision on the merits
can be reached. Principal among these are the standing of Congress
or one of its committees to invoke the judicial process, and the justiciabil-
ity of a dispute between the two political branches of government.
Standing should not be difficult to satisfy, even in the absence of a
statute. In Baker v. Carr.21 the Supreme Court stated that the question
turns on whether the party has alleged "such a perional stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues .... .122 Whenever the Exectitive
withholds information essential to a coordinate branch of government,
that branch is hindered, if not blocked, in the performance of its function,
This impairment of function should constitute sufficient "personal stake"
to establish the standing of a congressional committee.12 3
Any uncertainty as to standing might be relieved by an appropriate
statute specifically conferring standing on Congress and its committees to
bring suit. Such a statute is exemplified by the bill proposed by Senator
Kennedy which would give standing to "either House of Congress, a joint
committee of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress"
to bring suit challenging an assertion of executive privilege. 12 -1  An even
broader statutory standing is conferred by the Freedom of Information
Act, which permits any person to sue the federal agency denying a re-
quest for information. 25
The final barrier to judicial resolution of the privilege issue is the
possibility that the matter will be considered a political question and
121369 U.S. 186 (1962).
1221d. at 204. This test is applicable when the plaintiff does not rely on any specfic
statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972).
123A recent Second Circuit decision, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.
1973), reversing 361 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), suggests that an individual member
of Congress, suing in that capacity may not have the requisite personal stake to challenge
executive action which allegedly infringes upon the prerogatives of Congress. In Hollzmat,
a congresswoman challenged the President's use of American military forces in Cambodia,
which she claimed usurped the war making power granted to Congress under Article 1,
§ 8 of the Constitution. The district court held that she had standing: The court of appeals
reversed, finding no injury to the plaintiff in her role of congresswoman, since there
had been no interference with her right to vote or participate in debate on the Combodla
issue. The limitation on standing which Holtzman reflects, however, should not prevent
a court from finding that a congressional committee acting in its official capacity has standing
to obtain judicial review of the propriety of the executive's refusal to comply with its de-
mand for information.
124 S. 2073, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1364 (1973).
1255 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). While the Freedom of Information Act exempts nine
categories of information from disclosure, subsection (c) of the Act provides that it is not
authority to withhold information from Congress.
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therefore not appropriate for judicial determination. The doctrine of ex-
ecutive privilege as presently asserted by the executive branch is the prod-
uct of repeated and often sharp clashes between the two political
branches of the government. For this reason it may initially be thought
that the issue is incapable of judicial resolution. But in the past the
courts have not hesitated to intercede in legislative-executive conflicts.
This intercession is best demonstrated by the series of decisions in which
the Supreme Court resolved the dispute over the power of the President
to remove presidential appointees from congressionally-created commis-
sions and the power of Congress to restrict such removals.12 In so doing
the Court was able to draw a line
... between officials who were part of the Executive establishment and
were thus removable by virtue of the President's constitutional powers,
and those who are members of a body "to exercise its judgment without
the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the govern-
ment" . . . as to whom a power of removal exists only if Congress may
fairly be said to have conferred it.127
In Baker v. Carl;1'2 s the Supreme Court provided its most comprehen-
sive analysis of the political question doctrine. A Federal court may
properly refuse to entertain only those controversies (1) which the Consti-
tution explicitly remits to another branch of government for resolution
or where judicial resolution would reflect a lack of respect for the powers
of a coordinate branch of government; (2) where no judicially discover-
able and manageable standards are available; and (3) where fashioning
an appropriate remedy is inordinately difficult. 29
The Constitution is devoid of language remitting the resolution of
executive privilege claims to another branch of government, and it has
already been demonstrated that the "unreviewable discretion" asserted by
the Executive is itself without any explicit or implied foundation in the
Constitution. By the same token there is nothing in the Constitution
which expressly grants to Congress an absolute right to information or
120 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
127 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958), quoting Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1935).
128369 U.S. 186 (1962).
129 This third criterion received the greatest emphasis in Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion. The majority opinion actually referred to several other factors none of which
would be relevant to an executive privilege question, including the potentiality of embarrass-
ment for multifarious pronouncements by different departments on one question, an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, and the impossibility
of deriding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly requiring non-judicial
discretion. Id. at 266-330.
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a right to determine what information the President may treat as privi-
leged.
In Powell v. McCormack,18 the Supreme Court reviewed the action
of the House of Representatives in expelling Congressman Adam Clay-
ton Powell, Jr. The House claimed on the basis of article I, § 5 of
the Constitution 31 that it had been granted the explicit and exclusive
right to determine its own membership. The Court was unimpressed by
this argument and took the position that it had to decide what powers
were conferred by the Constitution before determining the scope of judi-
cial review.
If judicial review is appropriate despite the specific constitutional lan-
guage granting Congress control over its own membership, it should also
be appropriate in the context of executive privilege where there is no
such express authority:
Although the House in Powell raised the argument that an embar-
rassing confrontation would be created by a decision rejecting the claimed
legislative prerogative, the Court pointed out that on occasion the judi-
ciary is required to "interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance
with the construction given the document by another branch."'" Simi.
larly, the District of Columbia courts in resolving the question of grand
jury access to the Nixon tapes stated that their duty was to determine
the applicability of executive privilege to material evidence in a criminal
investigation. 133 If judicial resolution of an executive-judicial controversy
is proper, a decision regarding congressional access to the tapes or any
other executive documents or information would certainly create no
greater confrontation.
Having the power to decide an issue of executive privilege, the courts
do not lack available standards for review. In contrast to the difficult
problem of working out criteria for equal representation in the apportion-
ment cases, the standards for deciding the scope of executive privilege
can be based on distinctions no more difficult to make than those outlined
above,1 4 and no more difficult than those which courts are accustomed
to make in resolving problems of evidentiary privilege. For example,
in analyzing the claim of an absolute privilege in the White House Tapes
130 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
131 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 5, reads in pertinent part: "Each House shall be the Judge
of the ... Qualifications of its own Members. . . . Each Hou;e may .. . expel a Member."
132 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
133 Nixon v. Sirica, 42 U.S.L.W. 2211 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 1973); Io re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
134 Section IV, supra.
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Case, the district court referred to prior case law concerning the privilege
of secrecy among jurors.135
Although the privilege of the Executive to deny documents and infor-
mation to Congress has arisen in a context different from that in which
rules of privilege have generally developed, the same underlying policies
are applicable. The benefits and injuries, both to those directly involved
and to the general public, resulting from disclosure must be assessed.
If the courts can do this in defining the scope of executive privilege with
respect to evidence requested by the grand jury, they should also be able
to do it with respect to the information sought by Congress.
The last factor to be considered is the ability of the court to shape
an "appropriate mode of relief." Reference can again be made to Baker
v. Carr" and the willingness of the Supreme Court to reach the merits
of a "political" dispute. The Court in Baker indicated no qualms about
remanding the case, although it was evident that a decision for the peti-
tioners would require the lower court to order and supervise a plan of
reapportionment involving thirty-three senate districts and ninety-nine
house districts in the State of Tennessee. 3 - In a similar fashion, the
Court in Brown v. Board of Education'3 8 remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to weigh a series of complex factors in deciding
whether to admit the plaintiffs to public schools on a racially nondiscrim-
inatory basis. If courts are able to respond to situations such as these,
they have no justification for withdrawing from controversies over execu-
tive privilege. Appropriate relief would not be extraordinary and could
be accomplished either by an order to produce 39 or a ruling that the
information is privileged.
135 n re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.D.C.
1973), citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933). The possible interchangeability
of privilege rules is further suggested by the fact that the Clark opinion drew an analogy from
the attorney-client relationship.
An indication that the same considerations traditionally utilized to resolve issues of con-
tested evidence are appropriate to an executive privilege question is suggested by Judge
Gesell's resolution of the Senate Committee's suit to obtain Watergate related tapes. Judge
Ge:ell found that the Committee had not made such a demonstration of need as would
outweigh the Special Prosecutor's need for secrecy, because of the possibility that pre.trial
publicity might preclude the possibility of a fair trial for defendants in Watergate related
trials. 42 U.S.L.W. 2435 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 1974). See note 119, supra.
136 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
137 For an account of all the litigation and a description of the plan finally approved,
see Baker v. Carr, 247 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Tenn. 1965). It is understandable that in
such a task the lower court was willing to rely upon the litigants to implement or suggest
various plans and retain for itself the power to approve or disapprove.
138 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
139 Rather than an absolute order to produce, the court might require delivery of the
documents to the court for an in camera inspection, as in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
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A collateral consideration in terms of shaping appropriate relief is
the enforcement of an order against the Executive, should production
be required. In the White House Tapes Case, the court conceded that
it lacked the physical power to enforce the production order, but it con-
sidered this to be "immaterial to a resolution of the issues."'t'o
Regardless of its physical power to enforce them, the Court has a duty
to issue appropriate orders. The Court cannot say that the Executive's
persistence in withholding the tape recordings would tarnish its reputa-
tion, but must admit that it would tarnish the Court's reputation to fail
to do what it could in pursuit of justice. 141
Furthermore, judicial enforcement of an order resolving an executive
privilege dispute would not create other dangers against which the Su-
preme Court fashioned the political question doctrine: it would not "risk
embarrassment of our government abroad, or grave disturbance at home,"
nor would it embroil the courts in "overwhelmingly party or intra-party
contests."'1 42  For these reasons, we do not believe that the Executive
would refuse to comply with a resolution of the issue by the judicial
branch.
Nor do we mean to suggest that such a resolution would always be
against the asserted interests of the Executive. An absolute congressional
power to compel information should not be substituted for an absolute
executive power to withhold it. All unlimited power is inherently dan-
gerous, and it is the salutary function of the courts to circumscribe the
boundaries of the executive and legislative powers so that neither branch
is exalted at the expense of the other. The so-called executive privilege
seems preminently an issue to be resolved in this manner.
140 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1973).
141 Id. (footnote omitted). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 n.86
(1969) ("it is an inadmissible suggestion that action might be taken in disregard of a
judicial determination").
142Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 324 (Frankfurter,' J., dissenting).
